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Abstract

Abstract
Risk is the chance of an un-wanted event happening that will have a negative impact
on the organisation, the society, and the environment; it is an integral part of all our
day-to-day activities and therefore a potential hazard to all mankind and their
surroundings. Virtually, almost every activity on this planet is associated with a risk
of some sort or other.

How best to live with risk is every one’s concern in today’s competitive and ever
changing environment; a reason why risk management is one of the contemporary
issues of today.

Interestingly, however, although mankind has lived with risk since time immemorial,
the concept of risk management only came to light not so long ago. In the stone age
era, there was a great deal of uncertainty surrounding man’s existence; man was
aware of those uncertainties and the possibility of each of the major hazards but did
not know when and where they could strike and therefore had no clue of what to do
to prevent or minimise their occurrence.

Today, managing risk can be put into a systematic framework so that all possible
losses/failures that can result from the occurrence of untoward events (risks) are
prevented or minimised.

Despite the fact that risk management is a widely applied technique in many
organisations today, there are some maritime institutions that have not adopted the
concept to-date.

In this thesis, the author will demonstrate practically how the concept of risk
management can be applied to SAR activities at operational level to enhance the
effectiveness of the SAR service provision.

iv

Abstract

The thesis is aimed at assisting developing countries that might have difficulties in
applying the risk management concept to maritime activities, and in particular, SAR
operations.
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Chapter 1: Overview

1 Overview

1.1 Introduction
To most people, “Search and Rescue” is an ordinary expression with no hidden
meaning. In order to fully understand the meaning of the statement, it is imperative
to first break it down into two separate words:
1. Search; and
2. Rescue

The Oxford Dictionary of Current English language (Soanes, 2001), defines the two
words as follows:
Search: Try to find something by looking carefully and thoroughly.
Rescue: Save from a dangerous or distressing situation.

In the maritime and aeronautical industries, the terminology “Search and Rescue
(acronym SAR) is not new and is very often used. In the context of these two
industries, search and rescue is much more than just locating and rescuing those in
danger.

According to the IAMSAR manual (vol. II, 2001-2003 amendments), “search and
rescue means a rapid and coordinated response (or operation) often 1 mounted by

1

Sometimes non-trained volunteers or good Samaritans commit themselves to carry out the operations
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trained personnel who are provided with dedicated equipment and facilities, to locate
and retrieve those in distress situations, cater for their initial medical needs, and
finally deliver them to a place of safety ashore”.

Ordinarily, SAR operations are usually mounted to rescue those who might find
themselves in un-favourable conditions under any of the following circumstances:
¾ When either a vessel or an aircraft is missing (or overdue) along with
the occupants;
¾ When a vessel (with occupants onboard) is disabled, capsizing,
disoriented, aground or sinking;
¾ When people believed to be at sea or on any water body are missing
or are overdue;
¾ When a vessel unexpectedly runs out of fuel;
¾ When a vessel or aircraft catches fire, or develops any mechanical,
electrical or structural failures that might jeopardise the safety of life
of those on board and might also eventually present a serious danger
to the environment.
Search and rescue is a humanitarian2 service offered by States primarily to minimize
the loss of life, injuries, damage to the property 3 and environment by rendering
assistance to those in distress.

Usually, in most jurisdictions, maritime and aeronautical SAR activities are
harmonised presumably to minimise on the expense while at the same time
increasing the effectiveness of the entire SAR system, mainly through resource
optimisation and better management. This study, however, will mainly concentrate
on the activities related to maritime search and rescue operations.
2

Usually no fees are levied for the service.

3

However, this could be of secondary importance, depending on the situation
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While the quality of maritime SAR service provision is somewhat un-questionable
in most parts of the developed world 4 , the provision of SAR services in some 5
developing countries still leaves a lot to be desired; a reason why this research is
being conducted to assist in bridging this gap.

Principally, SAR activities can be divided into two major categories, namely:
¾ SAR at management level; and
¾ SAR at operational level

In order to give an in-depth analysis of how to apply the concept of risk management
to enhance the effectiveness of SAR service provision, this research will mainly
focus on analysing the activities of SAR at the operational level (operations).

However, although SAR operations usually address a full spectrum of activities
ranging from incident monitoring, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery
actions, the analysis will be centred on those operational aspects that are directly
related to an evolving or potential incident rather than the steady-state monitoring
activities that are conducted in the absence of a specific incident.

In light of the above, therefore, SAR at the operational level can be chronologically
divided into four main6 phases, namely:

4

Presumably due to the technological and managerial advancements exhibited by most developed

States.
5

Not all

6

These are considered the primary phases, although there could be other intermediate phases in-

between.
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i. Emergency phase
ii. Initial response (from the SAR System)
iii. Actual mission or activation of the rescue operation
iv. Mission conclusion

1.2 Primary Objective of the Thesis
To be of practical value, managing risk needs to be an integral part of the
management planning and review processes to support priority setting and decisionmaking by clearly informing managers about key risks, the likelihood of their
occurrence, the possible degree of severity (in case of risk occurrence) and what
options are available to prevent/minimise the risk occurrences.

With respect to SAR service provision, failure to manage risks can hugely reduce the
effectiveness of a given SAR system. This in turn jeopardises the organisation’s
ability to achieve the desired goals.

In this regard therefore, this thesis is aimed at practically demonstrating how the risk
management concept can be applied to SAR activities at the operational level to
enhance the effectiveness of SAR service provision.

1.3 Anticipated Benefits of the Research
It is anticipated that this research can be used as a guide by the interested SAR
organizations in developing countries to develop their own SAR operational
procedures and principles that are based on risk.

Having knowledge of the potential risks that can jeopardize the effectiveness of the
SAR system helps in enhancing the quality of SAR services by preventing or

4
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minimizing the occurrence of the untoward events through devising appropriate risk
control measures.
The SAR decision makers can then use the devised risk control measures as a basis
for:
♦ Developing appropriate action plans for the rescue operations that are based
on anticipated risks;
♦ Minimizing operating costs through prioritization of tasks that are in line
with the identified potential risks;
♦ Making well informed and rational decisions with respect to the following:
i. Recruitment of operational SAR personnel who possess the right
skills that are necessary to handle the identified risks;
ii. Determining the appropriate type and adequate quantity of
equipments that are required for the efficient execution of SAR
activities with due regard to the identified risks and the devised
corresponding risk control measures;
iii. Determining the sufficient number of facilities that are needed for the
efficient execution of the anticipated SAR activities;
iv. Identification of training needs based on the identified risks and the
corresponding remedial measures;

1.4 Methodology and Limitations
i. Methodology
This research was conducted using both primary and secondary material sources.
The primary data was obtained through distributing the questionnaires to SAR
operational personnel in various countries. A total of fifteen questionnaires were

5
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distributed to various SAR organizations in fifteen different countries, and out of
those fifteen, only five countries7 responded to the questionnaires.
Basically, the questionnaires8 were used to gather information about the events that
can go wrong (risks) at each of the four phases of SAR operations, the frequency of
occurrence of those un-wanted events and the measures employed to deal with them.
The data that was obtained was then carefully analysed, and through application of
the principles of risk management to the identified risks, appropriate risk control
options 9 corresponding to each of the identified risks were devised. Additional
information about the risks associated with SAR activities at operational level was
obtained by referring to secondary material sources10.

ii. Limitations
The main limitation was the difficulty in obtaining information from the developing
countries. However, despite the fact that none of countries11 from the developing
world responded to the questionnaires that were distributed to them, the information
gathered from those countries that responded to the questionnaires was sufficient for
conducting the research.

Another limitation was the time constraint; the time allocated for carrying out the
analysis was very limited and as such, a very detailed and deep analysis was not easy
to achieve within the allocated time framework.

7

8
9

These countries are: Sweden, German, Denmark, Australia and the United Kingdom

See appendix 1
Risk control options are the strategies that can be taken to effectively manage the identified risks.

10

Literature available both from the Internet and libraries about SAR risks

11

For purposes of respecting sovereignty, no particular country will be mentioned here. .
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1.5 Scope of the Thesis
The entire thesis will be structured to cover the following chapters:
♦ Chapter 2: Brief Introduction to the Principles of Risk Management.
In this chapter, a brief overview of the basic principles governing the risk
management process shall be covered.
♦ Chapter 3: Functional Requirements of SAR.
This is where a general review of the obligatory requirements for provision of
the SAR services shall be briefly highlighted.
♦ Chapter 4: Analysis: Application of Risk Based Approach to SAR at
the Operational Level. Analytical
This is where the risk management concept shall be applied separately to
each of the four phases 12 of SAR at the operational level. The aim is to
devise appropriate risk control measures for the identified risks. These risk
control measures can then used by the SAR decision makers as a basis for
making informed and rational decisions for conducting SAR activities at the
operational level.
♦ Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations.

12

Emergency phase, Initial response, Actual mission or activation of the rescue operation and Mission

conclusion phase

7
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2 Brief Introduction to the Principles of Risk
Management

2.1 Risk: What is Risk?
To different people, risk has so many meanings. If you happen to randomly ask
people about the meaning of the term “risk”, it is most likely that each will give their
own version although most of them will say “it is the prospect of getting hurt”. This
is not to mean that some people will be wrong, but the thing is risk can be defined
depending on someone’s perception of it.

According to the Oxford English dictionary, risk is defined as a hazard; a situation
that could be dangerous; or the possibility that something undesirable could happen.
Technically speaking, and from the risk management perspective, risk is much more
than just a hazard or a dangerous situation. Defining risk is rather complicated
because risk manifests itself in two dimensions: Likelihood and the degree of
severity.

Experts define risk is as a combination of the severity and the likelihood of
occurrence of an undesirable event. Put simply, risks are those things that, if go
wrong unexpectedly, can impair your ability to achieve the desired goal(s).

8
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Applied to maritime SAR, risk is the chance of an undesirable event happening that
will jeopardise the objectives of a given SAR system and hence pose a negative
impact on the marine community as well as the marine environment.

2.2 Risk Management
Risk Management is the process of measuring or assessing risks and then developing
strategies to mitigate minimize or control the assessed risks. The process is the
combination of risk assessment and the actions to deal with the risks (Frame, 2003,
P.14-15).

The principal focus of risk management is on the identification and

treatment of risks with the objective of adding maximum sustainable value to all the
activities of the organisation.

Generally, the strategies employed to manage risk may include transferring the risk
to another party, avoiding the risk, completely eliminating the risk, reducing the
negative effects of the risk, and accepting the risk.

Risk management is a step-by-step process per se and as such, certain principles
have to be observed when carrying out that process; these principles include, inter
alia:
♦ Risk identification
♦ Risk assessment, and
♦ Risk control

2.2.1 Risk Identification
This is the initial step carried out during the risk management process (Dickson,
1991, P. V).

9
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Although some authors generally categorise risk identification as one of the steps in
the risk assessment process, in this author’s opinion, risk identification should be a
stand-alone step. After risks have been identified, they can then be assessed. In the
context of this discussion, however, we will not enter any debate regarding the
subject matter because it will be of little importance to the main task at hand.
In some cases 13 , the phrase “hazard identification” is used instead of “risk
identification”. This is so because the two terms “risk” and “hazard” are often used
interchangeably to mean the same thing.

Risk or hazard identification consists of determining which unwanted events might
occur and bring about negative impacts on the organisational resources and society,
as well as the environment.

There are several ways in which risks can be identified. For this research, however,
risks were identified by using questionnaires that were distributed to the personnel14
who are in charge of conducting/managing SAR operations. The questionnaires
were seeking the experience and knowledge of those personnel to identify what can
go wrong at each phase of SAR operations. For better results, the risk identification
process should be a continuous process because new risks keep emerging as time
passes by (Dickson, 2003, P. 41).

Risks can be classified as internal or external. Internal risks are those risks that
organisational members can influence or control. On the contrary, external risks are
those risks that are outside the organisational control and therefore staff members

13

Depending on the author

14

From the selected countries

10

Chapter 2: Principles of risk management

may have little or no control over such risks.

Examples of external risks are

technological changes, political changes and risks due to force majeure15.

2.2.2 Risk Assessment
This is the most critical step in the risk the management process. After risks have
been identified in the first step, they are then assessed on a systematic basis. Risk
assessment generally refers to the process of analysing and prioritising the identified
risks with respect to their potential degree of severity of the consequences and to
their probability of occurrence.

Neatly expressed, risk assessment consists of two main steps, namely:
♦ Risk analysis; and
♦ Risk prioritisation

1) Risk analysis: This is primarily concerned with a broader and clear
understanding of the identified risks with respect to:
i. The probable root causes or source of the risk;
ii. The likelihood of occurrence of the risk, and
iii. The possible magnitude of the consequences or degree of severity in
case of risk occurrence
The trickiest thing, however, is to estimate or measure the two quantities of risk, that
is, the probability of occurrence of the undesirable event and the magnitude of the
possible consequences.

2) Risk prioritisation: This refers to the process of categorising the risks on the
basis of their likelihood of occurrence and the corresponding degree of severity
15

Force majeure is a Latin word meaning failures brought about due to an act of God or natural

disasters; for instance abrupt changes in weather that could bring about unfavourable conditions
leading to failure of an operation or otherwise.
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of the consequences in case of risk occurrence. By using this information, it
can then decided which risks should be given particular attention and the
appropriate actions to take.

From the SAR perspective, risk Prioritization is very important because focus is
concentrated at only those areas that are most likely to have the greatest impact
to overall objective of the SAR system.

Figure 2.1 shows an illustration of how risks are categorised on the basis of their

Degree of Severity

likelihood of occurrence and the degree of severity of the consequences.

2

1

4

3

Likelihood of risk occurrence

Fig.2.1- Risk categorisation
Source: Adapted from unpublished lecture handouts; World Maritime University, Malmö, Sweden

Table 1 is the summary of the description of the risk categories shown in fig. 1.

Table 1- Description of risk categories
Risk Category

Description

1

A combination of high likelihood and high degree of severity

2

High degree of severity of consequences but with low possibility
of occurrence

3

High likelihood of occurrence but with minor consequences

4

Low possibility of occurrence and low degree of severity

12
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2.2.3 Risk Control Measures
This is one of the last steps in the process of risk management. After careful and
thorough analysis of the risks, the principal issue that arises at this juncture is “what
should be done with the identified and analysed risks?” The process of addressing
this question is referred to as risk response planning (Frame, 2003, P. 134). It
involves devising suitable and cost effective remedial measures to deal with the
prioritised potential risks.

Risks are mitigated on the basis of their likelihood of occurrence and the possible
degree of severity of the consequences. It should also be noted that there are some
risks that cannot be mitigated completely; in which case, measures that can reduce
the risk to an acceptable level16 are devised.

However, for those risks which the organisation does not have any control over
(external risks), the only option available is to accept them and just pray that they do
not occur; for instance adverse weather conditions which may not permit the SAR
units to conduct a search and rescue mission in time.

However, adequate

contingency planning may, to some extent, help in reducing the eventual
consequences in case of occurrence of such risks (Frame, 2003, P. 135).

In a nutshell, risks associated with SAR operations can either be mitigated or
accepted depending on their nature17, likelihood of occurrence and degree of severity
of consequences.18

16

A level where the consequences are very minor

17

Internal risks (mitigate); external risks (accept but develop contingency plans to minimise eventual

consequences)
18

There are other means of dealing with risks, and these include risk transfer and risk avoidance.

However, these do not seem to apply well to SAR operations.

13
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2.2.4 Cost benefit analysis
Generally, this is not considered to be part of the risk management process.
However, its inclusion in this analysis is to bring to the attention of those devising
risk control measures to put into consideration the costs that might be involved in
implementing the risk control measures.

Broadly speaking, cost benefit analysis is the process that involves the weighing of
costs required for implementing the proposed risk control measures against the
anticipated over-all benefits expected from enforcing those measures.

On

19

ascertaining that the proposed remedial measures are cost effective , then the next
step is to effect the implementation of the devised control measures.

2.3 Why Risk Management
The principal reason why it is important to employ the concept of risk management
is to prepare for those future unwanted events that, if occurring without our
knowledge, would cause significant losses, injuries, deaths and other forms of
suffering. The idea is to be well prepared for emergencies and reduce the number of
undue surprises that might be encountered in the day-to-day operational activities
(Frame, 2003, P.20).

Broadly speaking, there are so many benefits associated with establishing and
maintaining a risk management culture in any organisational setting, and the
following are some of them:
i. Systematic, well informed and thorough method of decision making;
ii. Better utilisation of resources;
iii. Improved cost control;

19

In other words, if the benefits outweigh the costs involved in implementing the control measures

14

Chapter 2: Principles of risk management

iv. Strengthening of the culture for continued improvement;
v. Increased knowledge and understanding of exposure to risk;
vi. Creation of best practices to improve the quality of the organisation;
vii. More effective strategic planning.

15
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3 Functional Requirements of SAR

3.1 SAR System Requirements
The principal focus for setting up SAR systems is to increase the mariners’ chances
of survival at sea.

In most jurisdictions, SAR services are provided on a

humanitarian 20 basis primarily to save the lives of the citizens and to protect the
environment in case of a disaster.
For maritime activities, SAR systems help in rendering such a service to mariners
that might find themselves in un-favourable conditions at sea.

Maritime activities being international in nature, SAR services are also normally
conducted on an international (global) or regional basis, though not necessarily a
primary requirement. On the basis of this, the International Maritime Organisation
(IMO) member States are encouraged21 to form regional co-operations with the view
of having a uniform method of conducting SAR operations.

3.1.1 Typical SAR system set-up
In a very simplified format, a typical search and rescue system set-up can look as
shown in figure 3.1.

20

No charges are levied from the victims

21

It is not a must though
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SAR Coordinators (SCs)

SAR Mission Coordinators (SMCs)

SAR On-scene Coordinators (SOCs)

Search and Rescue units (SRUs)

Fig. 3.1: Simplified SAR system set-up

1) SAR Coordinator (SCs))
Generally, search and rescue coordinators (SCs) are the top level SAR managers and
their main responsibilities include, inter alia:
i. Establishing, staffing, equipping, and managing the SAR system;
ii. Establishing rescue coordination centres (RCCs);
iii. Providing or arranging for SAR facilities;
iv. Coordinating SAR training;
v. Developing SAR policies.
SCs are not directly22 involved in the actual rescue operations but they only deal with
management roles

2) SAR Mission Coordinator (SMCs)
Usually, SMCs are the personnel responsible for coordinating all the SAR missions.
In most cases, SAR operations are carried out under the guidance of an SMC. The

22

However, they can indirectly be involved in the rescue operations in one way or another
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SMC(s) usually carry out their duties from designated Rescue Coordination Centres
(RCCs). The main duties and responsibilities of an SMC include, inter alia:
i. Obtaining, compiling and evaluating all data on the emergency;
ii. Dispatching search and rescue units (SRUs) on the basis of this
information;
iii. Developing search plans that include determining limits for the search
area, selecting the search pattern, and designating the OSC;
iv. Controlling the SAR communication network for the assigned mission,
v. Monitoring the progress of the SAR mission and request additional
SAR resources as necessary;

3) On-Scene Coordinator (OSC)
Normally, the first unit or person to arrive at the scene of distress assumes the duty of
the OSC until the SMC directs otherwise.
In most cases, however, the OSC is designated by the SMC to coordinate the
activities of all SAR units at the scene of distress. The OSC should be the most
capable unit or person putting into consideration the following factors:
♦ SAR training, integrity, resilience/endurance and experience;
♦ Communications capabilities; and
♦ The length of time that the unit or person can stay at the distress scene.23

As a subordinate to the SMC, the OSC has several responsibilities and these include,
but not limited to:
i. Updating the SMC through periodic situation reports (SITREPs)24;
ii. Controlling all the on-scene communications between SRUs;
iii. Monitoring the endurance of all SRUs and call for replacement units if the
situation warrants so;
23

This explains why aircrafts are not good for acting as on scene coordinators because of their

inability to stay in a particular for long periods.
24

These are reports used to convey information to a higher authority about the status of the incident
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iv. Coordinating the efforts of all SRUs at the distress scene;
v. Implementing the search action plan from the SMC;
vi. Providing initial briefings and search instructions to the arriving SRUs.

4) Search and Rescue Units (SRUs)
An SRU is a facility with specially trained personnel, and provided with specialized
equipment for conducting SAR operations.
The primary responsibilities of an SRU include, but are not limited to:
i. Efficiently and effectively executing all the assigned rescue operations;
ii. Establishing and maintaining communications with the OSC or SMC, as
appropriate, prior to arriving at the distress scene, and until released from the
case by the SMC.

3.2 SAR International Obligations
The International Maritime Organisation, being the body in charge of regulating
maritime activities, is responsible for developing international standards that govern
SAR activities. In light of this therefore, there are various international regulations
developed by IMO (and other international organizations)25 which oblige Member
States26 as well as the masters of sea-going vessels to offer a duty of care to those
who might find themselves in distress situations at sea.

According to the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at sea, there is an
obligation for States to still offer SAR services to those in distress at sea even if they
are your enemies (12 August, 1949).
25

For instance, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), International Lifeboat

Federation (ILF), etc
26

And to some extent, non-member States
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In the following sections, a review of the SAR obligations for both member States
and the shipmasters to render assistance to the affected parties at sea, as per the
international law, shall be briefly examined.

3.2.1 Member States’ Obligations
Member States are obliged to ensure that necessary and adequate arrangements for
the provision of SAR services to the affected parties are put in place.

The following are some of the international obligations for Member States as far as
SAR service provision is concerned:

1) Convention on Maritime SAR, 1979.
Section 2.1.1
Parties 27 shall ensure that necessary arrangements are made for the provision of
adequate search and rescue services for persons in distress at sea around their coasts.

Section 2.1.8
Parties should ensure that their search and rescue services are able to give prompt
response to distress calls.

Section 2.1.9
On receiving information that a person is in distress at sea in an area within which a
Party provides for the overall co-ordination of search and rescue operations, the
responsible authorities of that Party shall take urgent steps to provide the most
appropriate assistance available.

Section 2.1.10

27

Member States
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Parties shall ensure that assistance be provided to any person in distress at sea, and
they shall do so regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the
circumstances in which that person is found.

Section 3.1.5
States should enter into agreements with neighbouring States setting forth the
conditions for entry of each other's rescue units into or over their respective
territorial sea or territory. These agreements should also provide for the expeditious
entry of another State’s SAR units with the least possible formalities.

2) International convention for the Safety of Life At Sea (SOLAS, 1974):
Reg. V/7: SAR services
Contracting governments are obliged to ensure that necessary arrangements are made
for distress communication and coordination in their areas of jurisdictions for
purposes of SAR service provision.

Reg. V/8
Contracting governments are obliged to ensure that life saving-signals are used by
search and rescue facilities engaged in SAR operations when communicating with
vessels or persons in distress.

3) The United Nations Convention on Law Of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982:
Article 98: Duty to render assistance
♦ Every state shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can
do so without serious danger to the safety of the ship, the crew or the
passengers to:

a) Render assistance to any person at sea in imminent danger of being lost;
b) Proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress;
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c) Render assistance (after a collision) to the other ship, her crew and
passengers and, where possible, to inform the other ship of the name of
his/her own ship, her port of registry and the nearest port at which she will
call.
♦ Every coastal State shall promote the establishment, operation and maintenance
of adequate and effective SAR services.

4) Salvage Convention 1989
Article 10 (2): Duty to render assistance
The States Parties shall adopt measures to ensure that, every master is bound, so far
as he can do so without serious danger to their vessel and persons thereon, to render
assistance to any person in danger of being lost at sea.

3.2.2 Ship-masters’ Obligations
Various provisions of international law coupled with a long standing customary
practice at sea, require masters of ships to render assistance to distressed vessels or
persons at sea whenever it is feasible to do so (IAMSAR manual, Vol.2, P.2-20).
Below are some of the obligations placed on masters of ships by various international
conventions.

i. International convention for the Safety of Life At Sea (SOLAS)
Regulation 33, Chapter V
This regulation places an obligation on masters of ships at sea to respond to
distress calls from any source at sea if their ship is within the vicinity of those in
distress.
On receiving a signal from any source that persons are in distress at sea, this
regulation requires the master of any ship that is in a position to provide assistance
to proceed with all speed to assist the affected people, and if possible, should
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inform them or the search and rescue service that the ship is doing so. However,
the master should ensure such assistance does not present any danger to the ship,
her cargo, passengers and crew.

ii. Salvage Convention 1989
Article 10(1): duty to render assistance
Every master is bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his
vessel and persons thereon, to render assistance to any person in danger of being
lost at sea.

iii. Brussels Convention on Assistance and Salvage of 1910
Article 11
Every master of the ship within the vicinity of the incident is bound, so far as he
can do so without serious danger to his vessel, the crew and passengers, to render
assistance to everybody (even though an enemy) found at sea in danger of being
lost.

3.3 Non-conventional Measures
Besides the conventions which act as mandatory instruments obliging States to
provide SAR rescue services in their areas of jurisdiction, there are also other various
guidelines and recommendations adopted mainly by IMO and ICAO28 intended to
assist States in the fulfilment of their humanitarian obligations to establish and
maintain SAR services. Most notably amongst those guidelines is the IAMSAR
manual, volumes I-III.

The manual was published jointly by ICAO and IMO

primarily to assist States in establishing, managing, conducting and coordinating
their SAR activities. Briefly, the contents of the three volumes of the manual are:
28

International Civil Aviation Organisation, an internationally recognized body in charge of

regulating aeronautical activities
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♦ Volume I: this gives guidelines for establishing the SAR organisation
and how to manage it effectively;
♦ volume II: this offers valuable guidelines on how to coordinate rescue
operations;
♦ volume III: this provides background information on mobile facilities
that are supposed to be carried onboard rescue units, aircrafts and all
SOLAS ships;

Generally, the guidelines developed jointly by the IMO and ICAO are intended to
meet the following objectives:
ii. Co-ordination between maritime and aeronautical services to ensure
efficient and effective SAR services;
iii. The possibility of combining aeronautical and maritime RCCs or to
carry out a close coordination among aeronautical and maritime RCCs
when they are independent; and
iv. The uniformity among the aeronautical and maritime SAR service
provision
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4 Analysis: Application of Risk Based
Approach to SAR at the Operational Level

4.1 Introduction
The previous chapters have served to set the scene for the practical demonstration of
how to apply the concept of risk management to SAR operations to enhance the
quality of SAR service provision.

Operations, which encompass a number of coordinated responses, form the heart of
the maritime SAR activities.
As mentioned in chapter 1, SAR operations can be29 categorically divided into four
distinct phases. Arranged in a chronological sequence, the four phases are:
i. Emergency phase;
ii. Initial response (from the SAR system);
iii. Actual mission/mission execution; and
iv. Mission conclusion phase.

The first thing to do in any risk management process is to identify all the un-wanted
events (risks)30 that are associated with a particular activity.

29

There might be some other forms of categorisation depending on the author, but this categorisation

was preferred for this study.
30

Things that can go wrong
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In this regard, therefore, a survey31 was conducted in five countries32 primarily to
identify the potential risks associated with each of the above-mentioned phases of
SAR at operational level.

In order to demonstrate practically how the concept of risk management can be used
to enhance the effectiveness of SAR service provision, the rest of this chapter will be
dedicated to analyzing the identified risks at each phase, establishing their possible
root causes, and then devising appropriate remedial measures corresponding to each
of the identified risks.

Collectively, the entire process is referred to as risk

management or risk based approach.
For purposes of simplicity33, the following criteria shall be followed for each of the
above-mentioned SAR phases to devise appropriate risk control measures
corresponding to the identified risks:

1. STEP 1: Risk identification and analysis
This is where all the risks that were identified through the questionnaire from the
five countries will be stated, along with their possible likelihood of occurrence,
corresponding possible consequences and the possible degree of severity of the
consequences (in case of risk occurrence).

The following key words shall be used throughout this step for all the phases:
♦ Identified risk: to mean all those risks or un-wanted events that were
identified by the SAR operational personnel from the countries that
responded to the questionnaires;
31

See sample questionnaire in appendix 1

32

United Kingdom, Sweden, German, Australia, and Denmark

33

Without necessarily following the systematic sequence of the risk management process described in

chapter 2
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♦ Consequences: to mean all the possible consequences that might take
place in case of risk occurrence;
♦ Likelihood of occurrence rating: to mean the possibility of
occurrence of the identified risk. The higher the rating, the more
likely the risk is to occur. A scale rating of 1-4 shall be used to
estimate the likelihood of risk occurrences (table 2a).
♦ Degree of severity or severity rating: to mean the possible
magnitude of the consequences in case of risk occurrence; the higher
the rating, the more severe the consequences. In this regard, a scale
rating of 1-4 shall be used to estimate the degree of severity of the
consequences (see table 2b);

On the basis of the information gathered through the questionnaires, the
following tables 2(a) and 2(b) shall be used throughout the analysis for rating the
likelihood of risk occurrence and the degree of severity of the consequences.

Table 2(a) - Scale for rating the likelihood of risk occurrence
Assign a

If the identified risk

rating of:

is:

Indicators

1

Very un-likely to occur

Once in 7 many years

2

Less likely to occur

A few times in a year

3

Likely to occur

Can occur any time

4

Very likely to occur

Very frequent (occurs regularly)

Source: Adapted from the International Maritime Organization (IMO), MSC/Circ.1023 (P.43)
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Table 2(b) - Scale for rating the degree of severity
Assign a

If the degree of severity

rating of:

of the consequences is:

Indicators

Minor injuries, minor equipment damage,
minor impact on the environment, minor
1

Minor

impact on the SAR organisation, negligible
impact on the SAR system.
Significant injuries, significant equipment

2

damage, significant impact on the
environment, significant impact on the SAR
Significant

organisation, significant wastage of
resources, significant reduction in the SAR
system’s effectiveness
Death of people and multiple injuries, severe

3

equipment damage/loss, severe impact on
the environment, severe impact on the SAR
Severe

organisation (loss of reputation), massive
economic losses, huge negative impact on
the country’s reputation, huge impact on the
SAR system’s effectiveness
Multiple deaths of people, total equipment

4

loss, appalling environmental damage, total
loss of reputation of the SAR organisation,
Catastrophic

huge economic losses, extreme loss of
country’s reputation (at the international
arena), extreme impact on the SAR system.

Source: Adapted from the International Maritime Organization (IMO), MSC/Circ.1023 (P.43)
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2. STEP 2: Risk categorization and prioritisation
For purposes of determining appropriate risk control measures, the identified
risks will be categorized on the basis of their corresponding risk priority number;
where:
Risk priority number = (degree of severity) X (likelihood)
(Source: Dickson, 2003, P.122)

Remedial measures shall be sought for only those risks with the priority number
greater or equal to 3. Risks with higher priority numbers should be given priority
over other risks, and as such, they must be dealt with first; this is what is referred
to as risk prioritization34.

This procedure is closely related to the illustration that was given in figure 2.1,
(p. 12), where risks with higher combinations of likelihood of occurrence and
degree of severity are given higher priority for mitigation purposes.

3. STEP 3: Risk control measures
This is where risk control options for the prioritized risks shall be devised.
However, in order to effectively deal with the risks, it is normally recommended
to first identify their sources/causes before devising the possible risk control
measures to cater for the risks (Frame, 2003, P. 3). In this regard, therefore,
attempts shall be made to first establish the possible root causes of the prioritized
risks before devising corresponding remedial measures.

34

What to tackle first?
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4.2 Emergency phase
Applied to SAR, the emergency phase is a generic term used to refer, depending on
the circumstances, either to un-certainty, alert, or distress phase (IAMSAR manual,
2001-2003 amendments, P. xvi)).

i. Uncertainty phase

This situation can be triggered by any of the following circumstances:
¾ When a vessel is reportedly overdue at its destination; or
¾ When a vessel has failed to make an expected position or a
safety report.
ii. Alert phase
An alert situation is said to exist when, following the uncertainty
situation, attempts to establish contact with the vessel have failed
and inquiries addressed to other appropriate sources have been
unsuccessful; or, when information has been received indicating that
the operating efficiency of a vessel is impaired but not to the extent
that a distress situation is likely.

iii. Distress phase:
This situation might prevail in any of the following circumstances:
¾ When positive information is received indicating that a vessel or a
person is in imminent danger and urgently needs assistance; or
¾ When it is beyond reasonable doubt that the reportedly overdue
vessel or person(s) is in distress and requires urgent assistance; or
¾ When information is received indicating that the operating
efficiency of a particular vessel has been impaired to the extent
that a distress situation is likely.
¾ When there is an attempt by the distressed vessel or person(s) to
contact the SAR authorities for assistance.
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For purposes of simplicity, only the generic term “emergency phase” shall be used in
the analysis.

4.2.1 Risk identification and analysis (step 1)
With reference to the criteria described in section 4.1, table 3 shows a list of events
that can go wrong (risks) during the emergency phase, the possible likelihood of risk
occurrence, the corresponding possible consequences, and the degree of severity of
the consequences (based on scale rating in tables 2a and 2b, section 4.1).

Table 3- Risk identification and analysis (Emergency phase)
severity

Likelihood

Identified risk

of risk

rating®

Possible Consequences

occurrence§



1. Un-necessary

Unnecessary deployment of resources

activation of the

that could otherwise be used for a

SAR system by

genuine

a false

wastage of resources as well as the tax

alert/distress

payers money;


signal

emergency;

this

leads

to

Creates unnecessary workloads for SAR
personnel and this might also put their

4

2

lives at risk;


Responding to false alerts can cause
large

and

unnecessary

delays

in

responding to real emergencies;


Reduces the over-all efficiency of the
SAR system because at times the SAR

§
®

Based on the rating scale in table 2(a), section 4.1
Based on the rating scale in table 2(b), section 4.1
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personnel may not take some alerts
seriously, thinking that they are false
when in actual sense they are not false


2. Inability of the

Leads to scanty information regarding

distressed vessel

the nature and location of the incident;

or person(s) to

this undermines the rescue personnel’s

effectively alert

3

capabilities to locate those in distress

the SAR

within the shortest possible time. This

authorities

might eventually lead to loss of lives or

3

extended injuries.


3. Delays by the

Late response from the SAR system; this

distressed vessel

leads to unnecessary delays in locating

or person(s) to

and

activate the SAR

eventually, this might lead to loss of

system when in

2

rescuing

those

in

distress;

lives that would otherwise have been

distress situation

3

saved had the RCC personnel been
alerted early enough;


This practice also causes panic among
the SAR personnel because it allows
them very limited time to adequately
prepare for the response.



4. Incoming

No response from the SAR system; this

distress alert, but

will lead to eventual loss of lives of

no personnel at

those in distress

the designated

3

3

rescue centres to
acknowledge the
call.
5. Misinterpretation



This will have an impact on the
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of

a

distress

successfulness of the rescue operations

message/signal
by

the

RCC

because all the subsequent rescue actions
2

will be based on the wrong information.

personnel

In the end this might lead to a failure in

3

locating the distress scene or to deploy
inappropriate resources


6. Failure of the

No response from the SAR system; this

distressed vessel

might lead to total loss of lives of those

or person(s) to

in distress or extended injuries.

activate the SAR

2

3

system to
request for
assistance

4.2.2 Risk Categorisation and Prioritisation (Step 2)
At this stage, all the risks that were identified in the previous sub-section 4.2.1, shall
be categorised and prioritised for purposes of mitigation. However, that will be done
on the basis of their likelihood of occurrence rating as well as the degree of severity
of the consequences. A factor called the risk priority number35 will be used to rate
and rank the magnitude of each of the identified risks. The greater this factor, the
higher the risk rating and hence the more urgency for the need to devise remedial
measures to address the risk. All risks with the risk priority number greater than or
equal to 2 will be subject to mitigation.

In line with this, table 4 shows a list of categorised and prioritised risks arranged in
accordance with the magnitude of the risk priority number, and as mentioned earlier,
risks with higher priority numbers must be addressed first.
35

Risk priority number = (likelihood of occurrence factor) X (degree of severity factor); see section

4.1
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Table 4- Risk categorisation and prioritisation (emergency phase)
Priority

Risk Category⊕

number**

Identified Risk
1. Inability of the distressed vessel or
person(s) to effectively alert the SAR

9

Very urgent

9

Very urgent

8

Very urgent

6

Urgent

authorities.
2. Incoming

distress

alert,

but

no

personnel at the designated rescue
centres to acknowledge it
3. Un-necessary activation of the SAR
system by a false alert/distress signal
4. Delays by the distressed vessel or
persons to activate the SAR system
when in distress situation.
5. Misinterpretation

of

a

distress

message/signal by the RCC personnel

Urgent
6

6. Failure of the distressed vessel or
person(s) to activate the SAR system to

6

Urgent

request for assistance

4.2.3 Risk Control Measures (step 3)
This is the last step, and it involves devising appropriate remedial measures for the
prioritized risks. However, efforts shall be made to first establish the possible root
causes of the (prioritized) risks in step 2, and thereafter, appropriate risk control
measures corresponding to each risk shall be devised.

**
⊕

Refer to section 4.1 (step 2) for the description of the priority number
This column indicates the degree of urgency required to mitigate a particular risk.
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1- Inability of the distressed vessel or person(s) to effectively alert the SAR
authorities.
Failure of those in distress to effectively alert the SAR authorities can hugely
affect the effectiveness of the subsequent SAR operations to rescue the
survivors.

a) Possible root causes:
♦ Ignorance of the crew of the distressed vessel on usage of onboard
communication equipment;
♦ Lack of proper means of onboard communication equipment;
♦ Communication equipment onboard is faulty: either due to poor
maintenance or bad handling;
♦ The distress signal is very weak;
♦ Alerting devices/equipment onboard expired: there are certain types
of alerting devices that expire after a specified period. There is
therefore a possibility that they can expire without the knowledge of
the shipboard management, and when time for use comes, i.e. where
there is an emergency, they cannot be effectively activated.

b) Appropriate risk control measures.
The following measures can assist to reduce magnitude of the risk:
♦ Training of equipment users on how to send out distress alerts or
how to activate the SAR system in case of an emergency;
♦ Improving the SAR communications capabilities to ensure that
distress information is clearly transmitted and in a timely manner;
♦ Only approved type of onboard communications equipment should
be authorised for usage;
♦ Regular inspections and maintenance should be carried out on all the
communications equipment onboard to avoid technical failures at the
time of usage of the equipment.
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Regulation III/20 of the International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS, 2004 amendments) requires all ships to ensure
operational readiness, maintenance and inspection of all lifesaving
appliances onboard. The same regulation also requires that, spares
and repair equipment shall be provided on board for all lifesaving
appliances (reg. III/20.5).

2- Incoming distress alert, but no personnel at the designated RCCs to
receive/acknowledge the call.
Although this might appear peculiar, it could be possible (in some jurisdictions)
that there is no one at the designated RCC or alerting posts, to
receive/acknowledge a distress call sent out by those in distress.

a) Possible root causes:
♦ No properly established 24-hour service;
♦ Insufficient staff at the rescue centres;
♦ Poor management of staff at the rescue centres, lack of staff
supervision;
♦ RCC personnel poorly motivated;
♦ Lack of professionalism/commitment amongst the RCC personnel.

b) Appropriate risk control measures:
♦ Ensure the continuous availability of a sufficient36 number of properly
trained personnel at the RCC to attend to any SAR emergency that
might arise;
♦ The RCC or alerting posts should be operated on a 24-hour basis in as
much as it is practically possible;

36

Just enough personnel to operate the station continuously; however, prior arrangements should be

put in place to quickly mobilise other additional personnel if the situation warrants so.
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♦ Instil a high level of professionalism 37 amongst the RCC personnel
through continuous training, exercises and performance appraisals;
♦ Motivate the RCC personnel to execute their duties diligently;
♦ Continually monitor the performance of the RCC staff.

3- Un-necessary activation of the SAR system by a false alert/distress signal
False alerts are any alerts received by the SAR system indicating that there is an
emergency situation but when in reality no such situation exists (vol. II
IAMSAR manual, P. 2-11).
False alerts are a great threat to any SAR system as they tremendously reduce
the effectiveness of the SAR system in one way or another.

a) Possible root causes:
♦ Un-authorised

users

playing

around

with

the

alerting

devices/equipment. For instance, curious passengers on board trying to
figure out how the equipment works might end up activating the
equipment without their knowledge;
♦ Accidental activation of the alerting devices/equipment by the shipboard crew;
♦ Mishandling of alerting equipment/devices due to lack of knowledge
of equipment usage. In line with this, statistics collected by the IMO
from various RCCs worldwide show that a big percentage of false
alerts (approximately 95% of the total false alerts received), are mainly
caused by lack of knowledge of the shipboard crew, and more so
ignorance of the relevant conventions, codes and regulations.
♦ Frequent technical failures of alerting devices;
♦ Human errors cannot be overlooked also.

37

Integrity, honesty and commitment
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b) Appropriate Risk control measures:
♦ Training of the ship-board crew on how to use the alerting
devices/equipment onboard;
♦ The shipboard management should put warning notices on all the
alerting devices that can be accidentally activated by passengers on
onboard to prevent un-authorised handling; simple warning notices
like “DO NOT TOUCH”, fully visible on the equipment can be very
useful in dealing with this risk;
♦ Only approved type of alerting devices should be authorised by the
responsible authorities for usage onboard;
♦ All the alerting devices/equipment used onboard every vessel should
be registered by the responsible authorities. This registration should
ensure that there is an easy way to identify the distress alerts with a
particular alerting device/equipment installed onboard a particular
ship. This can provide the SAR authorities with an easy way of
tracking the origin of the false alerts, and to take timely actions to
establish a communication link with the responsible vessel to confirm
the validity of the alert;
♦ The shipboard crew personnel should be sensitized about the
implications of sending out false alerts and be taught how to
immediately cancel them in case of accidental activation. Experience
has shown that most false alerts are caused by emergency position
indicating radio beacons (EPIRBs)38, and of late, from the GMDSS
system. If by accident (for example) an EPIRB is activated, the
shipboard crew should immediately make attempts to contact any
nearest coast station or an appropriate coast earth station or RCC and
cancel the distress alert. The International Maritime Organization

38

These are electronic units with built-in transmitters and a battery and they transmit radio signals

when activated
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(IMO), through the sub-committee on Radio Communications and
Search and Rescue (COMSAR) developed some useful guidelines to
administrations on the reporting of false alerts.39 In addition, the US
coast guard also developed some operating instructions on how to
cancel the false alerts in case of accidental activation.40
♦ All alerting devices should always be secured onboard vessels in such
a manner that prevents accidental activation. EPIRBs, for instance,
can be secured in brackets and only be removed from the bracket
when there is an emergency;
♦ Imposing heavy fines on those who irresponsibly activate the SAR
system by false alerts.

4- Delays by the distressed vessel or person(s) to activate the SAR system when
in distress situation.
With all the communication gadgets at their disposal, it is not uncommon for
some masters of the distressed vessels to take a lot of time before finally
deciding to activate the SAR system for assistance.

a) Possible root causes:
♦ Overconfidence of the shipboard crew and in particular the master;
♦ Negligence, by the shipboard crew;
♦ Failure of the ship-board management to recognise that an emergency
situation exists;

b) Appropriate risk control measures:
♦ The shipboard management, and in particular the master who has the
over-riding responsibility over the safety of the ship and her

39

See MSC/Circ.1078; COMSAR seventh session (13 to 17 January 2003).

40

For details, follow this link: http://206.65.196.29/marcomms/gmdss/false.htm

39

Chapter 4: Analysis

occupants, should be sensitised on the implications of taking too
much time to activate the SAR system when faced with uncertainties.
Although this could be a sensible idea not to un-necessarily activate
the system when actually the problem can be fixed, it is better to
notify the responsible authorities about the existence of an emergency
situation and assure them that efforts are being made to rectify the
situation. Technically, this is done by sending out PAN-PAN alerts
(instead of the usual MAYDAY calls) to the responsible SAR
authorities. Sending out PAN-PAN alerts does not necessarily mean
requesting for assistance but it is primarily meant to inform the SAR
authorities that a particular vessel has developed some problems and
the shipboard crew (in the meantime) is trying to rectify the problem.
This gives ample time to the SAR authorities to be on a standby
should the situation deteriorate.

5- Misinterpretation of a distress message/signal by the RCC personnel.
a) possible root causes
♦ Lack of proper training in use of communication equipment;
♦ Panicking of the RCC personnel brought about by lack of exposure
experience I handling distress alerts;
♦ Misunderstandings in the exchange of information between those in
distress and the RCC/alerting posts; this is especially possible if there
are no direct communication links between the RCC and those in
distress.

b) Appropriate risk control measures
♦ Proper training should be given to the RCC personnel on how to use
the communications equipment, and in particular how to respond to
emergencies when alerted.

40

There should be properly laid down
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guidelines on what steps to take on receipt of an emergency
call/message.
The IAMSAR manual volume II, gives important guidelines on the
type training the RCC and the rescue sub-centre (RSC) personnel are
supposed to undergo (2001-2003 amendments, P.1-11).
♦ Efforts should be made to ensure that there is at least one experienced
person available at the RCC/alerting post at any given time;
♦ The validity of all the distress information received about a particular
incident should be carefully evaluated in order to avoid undue
misunderstandings. This done, it can then be easy to decide on the
immediate course of action that is based on factual information.

6- Failure of the distressed vessel or person(s) to activate the SAR system to
request for assistance.
Failure by those in distress to activate the SAR system for assistance is a very
dangerous situation because no one will come to their rescue.

a) Possible root causes:
♦ No time to send out distress alert due to abruptness of the emergency
situation; for instance, vessel capsizes or sinks suddenly due to an
abrupt technical failure, force majeure, or otherwise;
♦ Those in distress do not know who to contact for assistance;
♦ Technical failure or faulty alerting devices/equipment;
♦ Those in distress have no means of sending out distress alerts to
activate the SAR system.

b) Appropriate risk control measures:
♦ All vessels should be required to carry onboard alerting
devices/equipment that can be automatically activated in case the
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vessel sinks abruptly without prior warning signs. Such equipment
should include, but not limited to:
i. Hydrostatically controlled EPIRPs (supported in a
COSPAS-SARSAT environment)41;
ii. The Global Maritime Distress Safety System;
iii. Hydrostatically controlled SAR radar transponders.
♦ Individual mariners should be encouraged to carry with them devices
known as Personal Locator Radio Beacons (PLRB). These operate
under the same principle as EPIRBs, the only difference being that,
they are designed for individuals. For better performance, EPIRBs
should be regularly inspected and well maintained to ensure that they
are ready to work anytime and anywhere. The United States Coast
Guard department of SAR in conjunction with the US National
Environmental, Satellite, Data and Information Service (NESDIS),
provide useful guidelines on how to carry out monthly inspections on
EPIRBs to ensure their operational readiness.42
♦ Publishing all the information that could be needed by distressed
mariners to activate the SAR system for assistance; such information
might include, but not limited to:

41



Emergency Telephone numbers;



Dedicated frequency channels;



Who43 to contact in case of emergency.

More information about how the COSPAS-SARSAT system works can be obtained directly from

the web site: http://www.cospas-sarsat.org/Description/concept.htm
42

Details about the procedures can be obtained from the web site:

http://www.sarsat.noaa.gov/EPIRB_inspecting.pdf
43

Which authorities/personnel/units
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♦ Float Plan enforcement: In order to cater for cases of overdue
vessels or individuals that, for some reasons, are unable to contact the
SAR authorities to request for assistance in case of an emergency, all
mariners44 should be required and encouraged to fill in a float plan of
their intended voyages and leave it with their next of keens or they
can file it with the SAR authorities or any other responsible authority
like the marine police. A float plan is a list of basic information
about a particular vessel, her crew, the number of passengers (if any),
her intended final destination and the expected time of arrival to the
destination, expected time of return to the home port and lots of other
relevant information. The float plan can assist the SAR authorities in
tracking the missing vessels or persons suspected to be in distress but
which, for some reasons, cannot alert the SAR authorities to request
for assistance.

However, mariners who filed a float plan should be advised to cancel
it on return from their trip/voyage. This is to ensure that the SAR
authorities do not conduct not unnecessary searches to trace them.

So when a vessel happens to be overdue either at its intended
destination or at the homeport, then the SAR authorities can be
notified to immediately mount a search for the overdue vessel.

This float plan arrangement, if well enforced, can go a long way in
assisting the SAR authorities to mitigate the risk of overdue vessels or
persons that, for some reasons, cannot activate the SAR system to
request for assistance when in grave danger. This system is in use in

44

Especially fisher-men
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several countries and the outcomes have proved to be very effective in
terms of saving the lives of mariners.
An example of a float plan layout can be viewed from the USCG web
site.45
♦ All vessels should be required to carry appropriate and sufficient life
saving appliances that are in compliance with chapter III of the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974.
The standards of such life saving appliances should be as specified in
the Life Saving Appliances code. For non-convention vessels, the
maritime administration should specify the appropriate type of life
saving appliances to be carried onboard such vessels.

4.3 Initial response (from the SAR system)
On receiving information about the possible existence of an emergency situation, the
preliminary action taken by the designated rescue coordination centre (RCC) 46
personnel is referred to as the initial response. However, this should not be confused
with the initial action taken by the distressed vessel or person(s) to activate the SAR
system in case of an emergency; instead this refers to the response from the
responsible SAR authorities after being alerted by the distressed vessel or person(s).
This SAR stage period is critical because all the subsequent SAR actions will
principally depend on the accuracy of the decisions and the appropriateness of the
actions taken by the RCC designated personnel in response to the distress alert.

45

See link: http://floatplan.uscgaux.info/download/USCGFloatPlan.pdf

46

It could be a Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC), i.e. when the centre is being jointly used for

both maritime and aeronautical responses; Or maritime rescue coordination centre (MRCC), i.e. centre
only used for maritime SAR activities or any other suitable arrangement.
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4.3.1 Risk identification and analysis (step 1)
Table 5 shows a list of the possible unwanted events (risks) that were identified to be
associated with the initial response phase. Also, stated along are the corresponding
likelihood of risk occurrence, the possible consequences (in case of risk occurrence)
and the corresponding degree of severity of consequences

Table 5- Risk identification and analysis (initial response phase)
Severity

Likelihood

Identified risk

of risk

Possible Consequences

rating⊕

occurrence§

♦ This leads to late deployment of

1. Delay in
response or

resources to assist those in distress;

longer response

3

time

could eventually lead to loss of lives that 3
would otherwise have been saved if the
response was quick
♦ Failure to save the lives of those in

2. Inappropriate
response to the

3

♦ Wastage of resources

incident

or

incorrect search

2

operations leading to massive loss of
lives and wastage of resources

planning

§
⊕

3

♦ Failure of the subsequent rescue

3. Improper,
inaccurate

distress

Based on the scale rating in table 2a, section 4.1
Based on the scale rating in table 2b, section 4.1
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4.3.2 Risk Categorisation and Prioritisation (Step 2)
The identified and analysed risks in section 4.3.1 are categorised and prioritised for
mitigation purposes as shown in table 6. This section is related to section 4.2.2 (for
the emergency phase), and therefore, more clarification may be sought from there.

Table 6- Risk categorisation and prioritisation (Initial response phase)
Priority

Category⊕

number**

Identified Risk
1. Improper search planning

9

Very urgent

2. Delay in response or longer response

9

Urgent

6

Urgent

time
3. Improper, inaccurate or incorrect search
planning.

4.3.3 Risk Control Measures (step 3)
In order to devise appropriate remedial measures for the prioritised risks it is
imperative to first establish the possible root causes for each of the prioritised risks.
Like in the previous sections, risks with higher priority numbers should be dealt with
first; in other words they have priority over other risks.
The following discussion is aimed at devising appropriate control measures for the
prioritised risks.

1- Improper search planning;
One of the initial principal requirements for conducting a successful SAR
mission is to draw up SAR action plans for executing the mission. To this end
therefore, a wrongly planned SAR mission can be very costly, both from the

**
⊕

Refer to section 4.1 (step 2) for the description of the priority number
This column indicates the degree of urgency required to mitigate a particular risk.
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economic perspective (wastage of resources and time) and from the casualty
point of view (massive loss of lives of those in distress).

a) Possible root causes
♦ The principal root cause for this risky situation is lack of training and
experience amongst the RCC personnel who are tasked with the
responsibility of drawing up plans for the mission;
♦ Human error might also be a primary contributor to this risk.

b) Appropriate control measures
♦ Appropriate training should be offered to the personnel in charge of
rescue planning and in particular, practical training in form of
exercises should be emphasized. Volume II of the IAMSAR manual
(2001-2003 amendments, Chap. 4), offers valuable guidelines on how
to carry out search planning;
♦ All the responsible RCC personnel should be given basic training in
human element-related courses to minimise the risk of errors that
might be committed during the search planning process.

2- Delay in response or longer response time;
Any successful SAR operation depends on the speed with which the mission is
planned and executed (ICAO SAR manual, 1994). However, more often than
not, the responses to the emergencies are unnecessarily delayed.

a) Possible root causes
♦ Over-documentation of the incident by the RCC staff leading to too
much time wastage;
♦ Technical or man power problems with first choice resource;
♦ Lack of professionalism amongst the designated RCC personnel;
♦ Over planning of the incident leading to too much time consumption;
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♦ Wrongly believing that those in distress are safer than they actually are;
♦ The RCC is doubtful about the existence of an emergency situation.

b) Appropriate control measures
♦ On confirming that a distress situation exists after receipt of an alert
call, the RCC personnel should immediately notify all relevant SAR
authorities and facilities that are likely to be involved in the mission
about the incident so that necessary arrangements can be put in place
to rescue the survivors within the shortest possible time;
♦ All the resources 47 that might be needed for conducting SAR
missions should be kept in a continuous state of readiness so that they
can be swiftly deployed any time in case of an emergency;
♦ Although documenting the details of the incident and the subsequent
evaluation of the reports about the prevailing incident is a good
working practice, care must be taken to avoid consuming too much
valuable time in doing so. Decisions must be made swiftly and
precise actions taken to rescue the survivors within the shortest
possible time. In SAR language, there is what we call “the first
golden hour”; within that hour, one should try as much as possible to
ensure that there is minimal time wasting. Experience has shown that
the chances of survival of the victims decrease on average by about
80% during the first 24 hours (ICAO SAR manual, 1994, P. II-1-1)
♦ Although devising plans for the subsequent rescue operations is one
of the recommended steps in conducting a successful the SAR
mission (IAMSAR manual, Vol. II), efforts should be made to deploy
at least one search and rescue unit (SRU) to the scene of distress as
soon as possible (after being alerted) while attempts are underway to

47

Not only the equipment but also the SAR personnel
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develop comprehensive rescue action plans for executing the entire
mission.
It should, however, be noted that the deployed SRU may not have the
capabilities to rescue the victims but they can help in comforting the
survivors as they wait for the main rescue units to arrive at the distress
scene.

Besides, this SRU can also act as a communication link

between the SAR shore-based authorities and those in distress,
thereby making it possible to take appropriate decisions and in
particular, the deployment of adequate resources to the rescue the
survivors;
♦ Whenever there is an incident, it must always be assumed that there
are survivors who need immediate assistance and that any delay in
providing such assistance can lead to their loss of lives or extended
injuries;
♦ If confirmation of the existence of an emergency cannot be obtained
without undue delay, the RCC should act on the basis of the doubtful
information until the real situation about the incident is verified;
♦ Training and instilling professionalism48 amongst the RCC staff can
be an effective measure to combat this risk.

3- Inappropriate or wrong response from the RCC;
a) Possible root causes
♦ RCC acting on the basis of wrong information supplied to them either
by those in distress or from third parties;
♦ The type of incident being reacted to is either under-estimated
(leading to under-deployment of resources) or over-estimated
(leading to over-deployment of resources).
b) Appropriate risk control measures:

48

Integrity, responsibility and honesty
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♦ The RCC should always ensure that they verify all the relevant
information relating to the distressed vessel before alerting other
relevant SAR authorities for subsequent actions.
♦ In order to have a rough idea on the right amount of resources to
deploy to the scene of distress, the RCC personnel or any other
responsible SAR authorities should undertake efforts to obtain, at
leas 49, the following basic information from the distressed vessel
before taking any action to deploy resources:
i. Nature of the incident or emergency;
ii. Number of persons at risk;
iii. Location of the incident;
iv. Types of detection aids and survival equipment available
onboard;50
v. Present Weather conditions at the scene of distress.

4.4 Mission Execution Phase
This is the stage at which the SAR units proceed to the distress scene to execute the
SAR mission (IAMSAR manual, vol. II, p. xix). It involves such activities as
searching for the distressed vessel or person(s), rescuing the survivors, providing
them with initial medical care (if necessary), and then finally delivering them to a
designated place of safety ashore where further assistance can be rendered to them.
This stage period is critical and as such, so many things can go wrong in the process.

49

It is recommended to gather sufficient information from those in distress. But for some reasons,

this may (at times) not be possible, and for that reason therefore, at least the most critical information
should always be obtained.
50

This information can be obtained from other sources like the IMO publications, government

databases or from the owners of the vessel ashore.
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4.4.1 Risk identification and analysis (step 1)
Table 7 shows a list of events that can go wrong during this stage period, the
corresponding consequences (in case of risk occurrence), the likelihood of risk
occurrence and the estimated degree of severity of the consequences.

Table 7- Risk identification and analysis (mission execution phase)
Severity

Likelihood
Identified risk

of risk

Possible Consequences

rating§

occurrence§

♦ This might lead to failure of the

1- Mix up or confusion
in issuing of
commands/

mission due to conflicting
3

information and commands; this

instructions, either

eventually leads to loss of lives

by the SMC or at

of those in distress

2

the distress scene by
OSC;
♦ Hindrance of the SAR mission

2- Inability to deal
with unplanned

execution;

media relations

♦ Instigation
3

of

un-necessary

panic within the general public
especially the relatives of the
victims through speculations;
♦ Damaging the public relations of
the SAR organisation.

§

Based on the scale ratings in table 2a and 2b, section 4.1
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♦ This might lead to the failure of

3- Jamming the SAR
communications

the mission resulting in un-

network with un-

necessary loss of lives. It is not

necessary

3

possible to coordinate the rescue

communication

mission without an effective

workloads;

communications network.
♦ Leads to loss of lives or

4- Inability to provide
first aid to the
survivors after

3

extended injuries to the already
2

3

rescued victims.

rescuing them from
danger;
5- Equipment failure;

2

♦ Might lead to failure of the

3

mission.
6- An accident or a

♦ Mission cannot proceed and

mishap occurs to

therefore no lives will be

the rescue unit en

1

3

saved.

route to the scene of
distress;
♦ Survivors might die before

7- Survivors too far
from immediate

3

they can get any form of

help; distress scene

assistance

51

too remote ;

SAR

♦ Leads to massive loss of lives of

with a big incident

51

the

response units.

8- Inability to cope

involving so many

from

3

the victims.
1

♦ Causes a lot of commotion

casualties (mass

within and outside the SAR

rescue operations);

organisation;

Far away from the nearest SAR facility
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♦ Hugely indents the public image
of the SAR organisation;
♦ Weakens

the

economical

competitive advantage of the
affected

country

at

the

international arena.
♦ Either leads to failure of the

9- Improper utilisation
of resources.

3

mission or leads to extensive

3

wastage of resources that could
have been utilised for another
mission.
♦ Hinders the smooth execution of

10- Inability to deal
with un-planned

2

the rescue operations especially

volunteer responses;

at the scene of distress.

4.4.2 Risk Categorisation and Prioritisation (Step 2)

Table 8- Risk categorisation and prioritisation (mission execution phase)
Identified risk

Priority

Category⊕

number**
1. Survivors too far from immediate help; distress

9

Very urgent

scene too remote.
2. Jamming the SAR communications network with
un-necessary communication workloads.

**

⊕

Very urgent
9

Refer to section 4.1 (step 2) for the meaning of the priority number
This column indicates the degree of urgency required to mitigate a particular risk.
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3. Inability to deal with un-planned media relations.

9

Very Urgent

4. Improper utilisation of resources.

9

Very urgent

5. Equipment failure.

6

Relatively urgent

6

Urgent

6

Urgent

4

Consider

6. Inability to provide first aid to the survivors after
rescuing them from danger.
7. Mix up or confusion in issue of commands/
instructions at the scene of distress.

8. Inability to deal with un-planned volunteer
responses.

(mitigating)

9. An accident or a mishap occurs to the rescue unit

4

Consider

en route to the distress scene.
10. Inability to cope with a big incident involving so
many casualties (mass rescue operations).

Consider
4

4.4.3 Risk Control Measures (step 3)
The mission execution phase is a critical phase and requires a high level of planning
and coordination. To this end therefore, it is imperative to ensure that all the possible
unwanted events that can deter the successful completion of the mission are catered
for well in advance prior to the commencement of the operations to minimise
surprises that could be encountered. In light of this, therefore, the following are the
various risk control measures corresponding to each of the prioritized risks in section
4.4.2. Like in the previous phases, the probable root causes for the identified risks
shall be identified first before devising appropriate remedial measures corresponding
to each risk.

1. Survivors too far from immediate help; location of distress scene too remote;
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Sometimes it happens that the scene of distress is too far from the nearest SAR
facilities, and as such, it might take a lot of time before the SAR units could arrive at
scene to assist the survivors.

a) Possible root causes:
♦ SAR resources and facilities not evenly distributed to cover a wider area
within the allocated search and rescue region (SRR);

b) Appropriate control measures:
♦ The SAR services should be distributed evenly throughout the entire
SRR by setting up localised rescue sub-centres (RSC) or alerting
posts. However, the distribution of these RSCs should be based on
the traffic density in a particular area. As a matter of fact, they should
be located in areas that have a high possibility of occurrence of
accidents. In addition, the distance from the nearest alerting post
should be put into consideration also; in other words, the RSC should
not be too close to each other. It should also be ensured that these
RSCs have full time watch-standers to maintain a 24-hour watch in as
far as it is practically possible. With this arrangement in place, it
becomes easier to respond to distress alerts anywhere within the SRR
within the shortest possible period of time.

2. Jamming

the

SAR

communications

network

with

un-necessary

communication workloads.
Jamming the SAR communications network should be avoided as much as possible
during the mission execution; reason being that without good communication,
nothing can be achieved as far as SAR operations and coordination are concerned.

a) Possible root causes
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♦ Too many in-coming calls from various sources52 both from within and
outside the SAR organisation;
♦ Poor and un-coordinated use of the communications equipment by the
SAR personnel from within the organisation.

b) Appropriate risk control measures
Communication is an integral part of any successful SAR mission.

The

following measures can assist in reducing the communication failures resulting
from jamming the SAR communications system during the mission execution:
♦ A comprehensive communications plan for the entire mission should
be prepared by the responsible personnel prior to the commencement
of the mission; it should be incorporated in the SAR action plan and
distributed to all relevant personnel within the SAR organisation,
especially the operations team.
As a minimum, a good communications plan for the SAR mission
should contain:
i. A list of dedicated and declared 53 frequencies/channels along
with the description of their functions/use and corresponding
IDs 54 ; for instance, dedicated channels to cater for public
relations matters, on-scene coordination, hospital/MEDICO 55
arrangements, SAR mission coordination, administrative tasks,
homing, logistics and supplies, etc.

52

Politicians, relatives of victims, the media, etc

53

Publicised

54

For example: Alpha 1, Alpha 2, Bravo 1, Bravo 2, etc.

55

This term is used to refer to medical advice given by doctors to the SAR personnel during or after

the operations. It is the exchange of medical information and recommended treatment to the survivors
before they are delivered to a medical facility ashore.
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This will make it easy for those involved in the mission to know
which channels they can access certain people or teams and as
such will minimise possibilities of jamming the system.
ii. Communications procedures; where does the authorisation to use
certain frequencies/channels come from.
iii. The names of individuals (if practically possible) who are
assigned communication equipments like the radios and the
frequencies at which they can be reached.
iv. All the important notes that might be beneficial to the mission
execution.
♦ Optimal use should be made of all existing communications equipment
and facilities if practicable possible (IAMSAR manual, vol. II, 20012003, P. 2-17).

3. Improper utilisation of resources.
Usually, and in most jurisdictions, SAR resources are scarce; presumably the
biggest challenge for any SAR organisation. Poorly utilising the already meagre
resources can be a huge setback as far as SAR service provision is concerned.

a) Probable root causes:
♦ Poor planning of resources usage;
♦ No planning at all on usage of resources;
♦ Over-responding to an incident by un-necessarily deploying too much
resources;
♦ Extended un-necessary SAR operations that may not yield any good
results.
♦ Also, poor initial search planning that leads to searching the wrong areas
during the rescue operations can cause unnecessary wastage of resources.
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b) Appropriate risk control measures
♦ Qualified and experienced personnel should do the initial search planning.
Proper search planning helps in determining the approximate quantity of
resources that might be needed for deployment to carry out the
operations;
♦ Knowing when56 to suspend or to end a search operation that might not
succeed due to some reasons that could be beyond the control of the SAR
organisation;
♦ A properly drawn plan on how to utilise the available resources during the
mission execution can be very helpful. A good plan for resource usage
should cater for:
i. How to get access to the available resources;
ii. How to allocate the available resources;
iii. The quantity and locations of the available resources;57
iv. How to get extra or additional resources in case they are; needed to
supplement the available and declared resources;
v. The personnel in charge of resources (the logistics section, maybe);

2. Equipment failure;
More often, the equipment used to conduct SAR operations un-expectedly fail at the
time when they are most needed. This is bad because it jeopardises the successful
completion of the mission.

a) Possible root causes:
♦ The principal root cause for this risk is lack of regular maintenance for
all the equipment that might be used for the operations;
56

The proper timing; this depends on the prevailing circumstances

57

Most of the resources used in the SAR operations are normally not located in one place; for instance

some could be in various government ministries, NGOs, Private institutions, etc
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♦ Poor equipment handling during the operations.

b) Appropriate risk control measures:
♦ All the equipment that might be used for SAR operations should
always be kept in a continuous state of readiness.

This must be

ensured through carrying out regular inspections, testing and
maintenance of the equipment. Testing can be carried out during the
exercises to confirm the effectiveness and reliability of the equipment.
♦ All the SAR operational personnel should be trained on how to use and
properly handle the SAR equipment.

3. Mix up or confusion in issue of commands/ instructions at the scene of
distress.
It is not very uncommon, in poorly organized SAR missions, for confusions to arise
at the scene of distress during the operations.

a) Possible root causes:
♦ No particular person has been designated to be in charge of coordinating
the on-scene operations;
♦ The person in charge of the on-scene coordination is incompetent;
♦ Ambiguity of the person in charge of on-scene coordination.

b) Appropriate risk control measures:
♦ Always, and whenever possible, there should be one particular
designated person to be in charge of coordinating the on-scene
operations. Normally, this person is called the On-Scene Coordinator
(OSC).
♦ To minimise coordination ambiguities at the scene of distress, the OSC
should be chosen on the basis of his/her knowledge and experience;
preferably, the OSC coordinator should be the most experienced person
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amongst the available choices.

In most cases, however, the OSC

coordinator need not be nominated during the initial stages of the
mission. To this end therefore, any person(s) or facility to first arrive at
the scene of distress can assume the role of OSC until the responsible
SAR authorities decide it otherwise. For better coordination of actions,
the OSC should be communicated to every one at the scene of distress.

4. Inability to deal with unplanned media relations.
To the majority of people, it is an unfortunate but yet a realistic fact that bad news is
more interesting than good news. The media, if not well planned for in advance, is
one of the greatest enemies for successful SAR operations. As a matter of fact, some
SAR missions fail to successfully rescue those in distress because of failure in
dealing with the media.

On the contrary, however, the media can be a very useful SAR support resource if
well planned for; they can keep the general public well informed of what is exactly58
going on about the mission and hence helps in lessening the tension amongst the
relatives of the victims.

a) Possible root causes of the media risk:
♦ The initial SAR plans that were drawn did not cater for the media
briefings;
♦ The entire SAR organizational set up does not cater for media relations;
♦ No properly trained personnel within the SAR organizational set up, and
especially at the RCC, to deal with the media in case there is disaster;
♦ The person(s) nominated to deal with the media at the time of the
incident messes up the briefings;

58

Based on factual information from the SAR organisation and not speculations
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b) Appropriate risk control measures
♦ Planning how to deal with the media in case of a disaster should be an
integral part of any SAR organisation. Effective management of media
relations is as vital as effective coordination and execution of the SAR
mission itself;
♦ All the personnel nominated to deal with the media within the SAR
organisation should be given proper training on how to carry out this
responsibility in case of a disaster.
♦ The SAR organisation, and especially the RCC, should establish a
good relationship with the mainstream media companies in the
country/region. This should be done during the normal working day
without first waiting for the disaster to strike. In this way both parties
get to know each other; the media learns about the activities of the
SAR organisation, and the SAR organisation learns about the media
and how to deal with them in a professional manner.
♦ In the event of an incident, the personnel designated to deal with the
media should endeavour to give out (to the media groups) sufficient
information about the incident and the actions being taken to rescue the
survivors. The ICAO/IMO joint working group on harmonisation of
aeronautical and maritime SAR activities developed some useful
guidelines on how the SAR organisation should handle the media.59

5. Inability to deal with unplanned volunteer responses.
It is a well-known customary practice that volunteers will always come in to assist
the victims of a disaster, any time and anywhere, even without being called upon to
do so. Although volunteers provide tremendous support to the SAR operations,
failure to properly manage and coordinate them during the operations at the distress
scene might end up jeopardising the rescue mission.

59

See COMSAR Circ. 3/9/5
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a) Possible root causes:
♦ Poor mission planning that does not anticipate volunteer participation;
♦ Untrained volunteers may have difficulties in understanding the
instructions issued out by the OSC, and this can bring about some
confusion and uncoordinated actions at the scene of distress leading to a
possible failure of the mission.

b) Appropriate risk control measures:
♦ Always, the SAR organisation must anticipate for volunteer participation.
To this end, the SAR action plan should cater for volunteer responses and
how best to deal with them at the distress scene during the operations. In
particular, the plans should address the probable roles that the volunteers
can be assigned at the scene of distress.
♦ The OSC at the scene of distress should brief all the volunteers on what is
expected of them, and thereafter assign them appropriate roles putting
into consideration their capabilities.

6. Inability to provide first aid to the survivors after rescuing them from
danger.
It can be a very unfortunate situation for the victims to die after the rescuers have
done the most difficult part of rescuing them from danger. Failure to provide initial
medical care to the already rescued victims can result in their death or extended
injuries; also, poorly administering the medical care can be as disastrous.

a) Possible root causes of this risk
♦ None of the SAR personnel present at the scene of distress has basic
professional knowledge in administering first aid care to the survivors;
♦ Provision of initial medical care to the survivors was not catered for
during the mission planning phase;
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♦ Emergency pack containing first aid medicine and medical equipment
forgotten ashore in an attempt to get to the scene of distress as quickly
as possible (hurrying);
♦ Undermining the importance of providing initial medical care to the
rescued victims.

b) Appropriate risk control measures:
♦ All SAR emergency personnel should be given sufficient training in
provision of basic first aid care. This will enable them to provide basic
life support services to the rescued victims before they are delivered to
the shore-based medical facilities;
♦ While the speed of response to rescue the victims in distress is of
primary importance in any successful SAR mission, care must be taken
to ensure that the SAR responding crafts depart with all the required
medical

kits,

equipment

and

personnel

with

knowledge

of

administering first aid care to the survivors;
♦ Provision of first aid to the already rescued victims should always be
given priority;
♦ For complicated medical cases that could be beyond the expertise of
the emergency personnel, there should be proper arrangements in place
for the rescue personnel in charge of administering first aid to
survivors to secure medical advises from reputable medical
practitioners ashore if need be. In addition, there should also be proper
arrangements for the swift medical evacuation (MEDVAC) of
critically ill survivors in as far as it is practically possible.

7. An accident or a mishap occurs to the rescue unit en route to the distress
scene;
In unfortunate circumstances, an accident may occur to the SRU personnel either
en route to, or from the scene of distress. This can be disastrous because it not
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only leads to the failure of the mission but also throws a lot of panic amongst the
other SRUs.

a) Possible root causes:
♦ Bad or unfavourable weather conditions;
♦ Cruising at too high speeds in an attempt to get to the scene of
distress as quickly as possible;
♦ Taking bad routes with many hazards on the way to or from the scene
of distress;
♦ Poor operating condition of the rescue crafts used by the SAR
emergency personnel;
♦ Poor design and construction of the rescue craft;
♦ The crew of the rescue crafts not well trained or lack experience and
exposure to SAR operating environment;
♦ Force majeure.

b) Appropriate risk control measures
♦ Devise contingency measures to prepare for cases of bad weather.
This can be reflected in the design and construction of the rescue
crafts; for instance, the crafts could be designed and constructed to
withstand adverse weather conditions. 60 Some rescue crafts are
designed to have positive stability at all angles of heel so that even if
it capsizes, it rights itself back to the upright (stable) position.61
♦ It is a simple fact that the victims of a disaster will not benefit from a
rescue craft that has ran aground or capsized en route to the distress
scene. To this end therefore, proper route planning to (and from) the
60

Weather proof

64

Chapter 4: Analysis

scene of distress should always be given due consideration before the
mission commences and it should always be remembered that the
shortest route is not always the safest;
♦ The crew of the rescue crafts should be well trained62, and if possible,
should have sufficient exposure and familiarisation to the SAR
operational environment, possibly through regular exercises;
♦ Although speed is of primary importance as far as SAR operations
are concerned, too much of it can be disastrous. In this regard,
therefore, the operator of the rescue craft should avoid un-necessary
over-speeding especially when the weather conditions are not that
favourable.

Over-speeding can also lead to excessive fatigue

amongst the SAR personnel even before the commencement of the
rescue operations at the distress scene;
♦ Last but not least, all the rescue personnel should be provided with
personal protective equipment (PPE) that can increase their chances
of survival in case of a mishap.

8. Inability to cope with a big incident involving so many casualties (mass
rescue operations).
A mass rescue operation (MRO) is one that involves the need for immediate
assistance to large numbers of persons in distress such that the capabilities
normally available to the SAR authorities are very inadequate. MROs, although
are low probability events, can be very disastrous in case they occur. Very often,
SAR service providers fail to cope with such big incidents when they occur.

61

Self-righting; but this only works if there is no shift of personnel and all the equipment onboard, i.e.

no shift of cargo. In other words, the rescue personnel must be securely fixed in one position using
the seat belts.
62

Training should address among other things, personal survival at sea in case of an accident, how to

escape from a capsized vessel, how to re-right a capsized vessel in order to continue with the mission,
etc.
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a) Possible root causes:
♦ No contingency measures that are in place to deal with such incidents in
case they occur;
♦ Failure of the SAR organisation to recognise that such incidents, although
very rare, can actually strike;

b) Appropriate risk control measures.
♦ Firstly, the SAR organisation must recognise that anything can happen
and that that a big incident that involves large numbers of casualties can
actually occur any time;
♦ Secondly, the SAR organisation should develop appropriate contingency
measures to deal with big incidents in case they occur. Such measures
may include, but are not limited to:
i. Liaising with all the emergency service providers in the
country/region prior to the incident, and to make necessary
arrangements in form of agreements that can enable the
pooling together of all the available resources from different
sources to deal with the disaster in case it strikes;
ii. If SAR services are not provided on a regional basis, the
SAR organisation should consider to enter into agreements
with other SAR service providers in the neighbouring States
primarily to solicit for their cooperation and assistance in
case of a big incident that one single SAR organisation in the
country cannot handle. If such an arrangement is put in
place, inter-operability of the equipment used within the
region should be given due consideration when buying new
equipment, especially the communication gadgets.
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♦ Additionally, the SAR organisation should put into consideration the
guidelines for mass rescue operations developed jointly by IMO and
ICAO. 63

4.5 Mission Conclusion Phase
This is the stage when the SAR mission comes to an end. However, just like in the
previous phases, there are certain things that can go wrong during this stage and
impair the successful completion of the entire operation. Efforts invested in the
previous phases can be ruined by certain undesirable events (risks) that might occur
in this final phase.

4.5.1 Risk identification and analysis (step 1)
Table 9 shows a list of possible events that, if not catered for during the mission
conclusion phase, can jeopardise the successful completion of the mission, and might
also negatively impact on the effectiveness of the future SAR missions.
In addition, the table shows the likelihood of occurrence of each risk, the possible
corresponding consequences, and the possible degree of severity of the consequences
(in case of risk occurrence).

63

For details of these guidelines, see COMSAR/Circ.31, dated 6th February, 2003
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Table 9- Risk identification and analysis (mission conclusion phase)
Likelihood
Identified risk

of risk

Severity
rating§

Possible Consequences
§

occurrence

♦ Unnecessary

1- Mission

of

lives

of

concluded

survivors that are not yet rescued

prematurely on

due to the wrong belief that every

the

basis

of

3

body has been rescued;

information

in distress due to the wrong belief

that:

that no distress situation existed

the

3

♦ Unnecessary loss of lives of those

wrong

-

loss

distress

leading to failure to respond to the

situation does not

emergency;

exist any more or
never existed in the
first place;
- all the survivors
have been rescued
to

♦ Mistakes or wrong things that

conduct a post

might have been committed during

debrief on the

the mission will not be un-veiled

2- Failure

incident.

2

and are most likely to be repeated
during the next SAR mission. This
is very bad because the SAR
personnel are not provided with a
chance to learn from their mistakes.

3- Inability of the

♦ The rescue team cannot quickly

rescue team to

and effectively respond to another

§

Based on the scale ratings in tables 2a and 2b, section 4.1
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quickly

return

3

to a state of

emergency situation when called

2

upon

readiness
4- Inability
effectively
cater

for

♦ The already rescued persons might

to
2
the

die if not well cared for; that would
be

very

bad

especially

3

after

rescued

investing tremendous efforts to

survivors.

rescue the survivors.

4.5.2 Risk Categorisation and Prioritisation (Step 2)
In table 10, the risks identified in the previous section (4.5.1) are categorised and
prioritised for mitigation on the basis of their likelihood of occurrence and the degree
of severity of the consequences.

Table 10- Risk Categorisation and Prioritisation
Identified risk

Priority
number** Category⊕

1- Mission concluded prematurely on the

9

Very Urgent

6

Urgent

6

Urgent

4

Consider

basis of wrong information
2- Inability of the rescue team to quickly
return to a state of readiness
3- Inability to effectively cater for the
rescued survivors
4- Failure to conduct a post debrief on the
incident

**

⊕

Refer to section 4.1 (step 2) for the meaning of the priority number
This column indicates the degree of urgency required to mitigate a particular risk.
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4.5.3 Risk Control Measures (step 3)
The following are the risk control measures corresponding to the prioritised risks in
the previous section. Just like in the previous phases, the possible root for the risks
will be established first and thereafter, the appropriate risk control measures shall be
devised.

1- Mission concluded prematurely on the basis of wrong information.
a) Possible root causes
♦ Bad mission planning and coordination;
♦ Incompetence of the SMC, the person entrusted with the overall
authority to declare the mission concluded.

b) Appropriate risk control measures
♦ Only one person (usually the SMC64) should be authorised with the
powers and responsibility of declaring the mission to be concluded.
The mission should always be concluded on the basis of the following
measures:
i. If no distress situation exists any more;
ii. If there is evidence that all the survivors have been rescued, and
this should be ensured through proper counting of the survivors
and then cross-checking the results of counting with the total
number of persons who were believed to be onboard. It should
also be noted that, the already rescued survivors might be used to
provide some useful information regarding the total number of
persons that were most likely to be onboard, and the possible
locations of the un-rescued persons.

64

Search and rescue mission coordinator or commander
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i. If all possible measures to rescue the survivors have failed, and
further searching may not yield any fruitful results and could be
wastage of resources.

The SMC or whoever is charged with the responsibility of concluding the
mission should be a very competent person. When he/she has finally decided to
call off the mission, efforts must be made to notify all the responsible SAR
authorities, and especially the rescue teams about the termination of the
mission.

2- Inability to effectively cater for the rescued survivors.
Failure to care for the already rescued survivors can be a very big setback to the
rescue team; especially after doing all the hard part of retrieving them from
danger.

a) Possible root causes
♦ Ignorance of the rescue team on the implications of neglecting the
survivors at the time when they need intensive care;
♦ Survivors not debriefed;
♦ No resources to cater for the medical needs of the survivors.

b) Appropriate risk control measures
♦ All SAR personnel should be sensitised about the implications of not
providing proper care to the already rescued survivors;
♦ Debriefing is not only for the SAR team, but also for the survivors as
well.

The survivor debriefing is aimed at getting the following

information:
ii. The survivors medical history, so you can know how to handle
them; and
iii. The nature and extent of injuries they might have sustained.

71

Chapter 4: Analysis

However, according to the IAMSAR manual, volume II, proper care
should be taken to avoid over-questioning of the survivors because
that can worsen their condition. Also during the questioning, a calm
voice should be used (2001-2003 amendments, P. 6-15).
♦ The SAR authorities should always ensure sufficient availability of
trained and experienced personnel who can provide proper care to the
already rescued survivors.

3- Inability of the rescue teams to quickly return to a state of readiness.
a) Possible root causes
♦ Team members so stressed, tired, exhausted or worn out;
♦ Team members very disappointed presumably due to any of the
following circumstances:
•

Failed mission;

•

Death of the rescued survivors while en route ashore;

•

Victims found already dead at the scene of the distress;

•

Etc.

b) Appropriate risk control measures
♦ There is no doubt that SAR operations are very stressful, tiring and
extremely exhaustive. However, one of the best ways of minimising
the after-effects of the SAR operations to the operational personnel is
to address it through training. All the SAR operational personnel
should be subjected to such training and exercises that can instil high
levels of resilience and endurance in their bodies to enable them cope
with the stressful and demanding conditions during the rescue
operations.
♦ Death of victims: All SAR operational personnel should always be
counselled to cope with the realities of their profession that sometimes
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victims may die; sometimes death could be inevitable. They should
always keep this at the back of their minds so that whenever they come
across such situations, it does not bother them so much despite the fact
that they still feel sympathetic to both the victims and their families for
the deaths.
♦ Failed mission: Just in the same manner as for the death of victims, it
should be brought to the attention of SAR personnel that sometimes
the mission may not be successful due to some reasons. The point of
central concern should be to find out what went wrong during the
mission so that mistakes that lead to the failure of the mission are
sorted out before the next rescue encounter. Normally, this should be
done during the debriefing session.
♦ Motivate the rescue team to arouse their commitment towards the
rescue activities.

4- Failure to conduct a post debrief session at the end of the operations.
In plain language, debriefing means to question and discuss in details about the
completed mission. In SAR, debriefing is conducted to sort out things that went
wrong during the mission execution. In addition, debriefing also helps the rescue
team personnel as well the survivors to deal with the physical or psychological
traumas that they might have experienced during the entire mission.

a) Possible root causes
♦ Poor SAR mission planning that does not cater for the debriefing
session;
♦ The rescue teams are scattered at the end of the mission.

b) Appropriate risk control measures
♦ During the planning stages of the SAR mission, proper arrangements
should always be made to cater for the debriefing of all the personnel
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who participated in the rescue mission at the end of the operations.
This, when done properly, helps to sort out mistakes that were
committed during the rescue operations. The idea here is to learn from
the past wrong actions so that similar mistakes can be avoided in the
future operations. One principal thing to note here is that, members
should avoid the culture of blaming each other for the mistakes that
were committed during the mission, as that practice will not take them
anywhere close to improving the effectiveness of the SAR service
delivery.

4.6 Cost Benefit Analysis and Action Planning
After devising all the appropriate counter measures for the identified risks, it is very
important to examine the cost effectiveness of implementing each measure.
Normally this is done by comparing the costs involved in implementing a given risk
control option with the corresponding benefits65 that come with implementing the
measures.

If the costs of mitigating a particular risk far out-weigh the over-all benefits, then it is
advisable to accept the risk. However, in such cases of risk acceptance, appropriate66
contingency measures should be put into place to minimize the effects of the
consequences in case of risk occurrence.

Usually, the risk analysis process provides more than one possible risk control option
to deal with a particular risk. To this end therefore, the decision makers should select
the most cost effective risk control options for implementation.
65

For SAR, benefits are measured in terms of the SAR system’s effectiveness; how many more lives

are likely to be saved by implementing the control measures.
66

With due regard to the identified risk under consideration
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The selected cost effective risk control options should then be transformed into an
appropriate action plan that will promote the efficient and effective delivery of the
SAR services. Figure 4.1 shows a summary of the risk management process.

Identify

Assess

Devise risk

Risks

Risks

Control measures

Develop appropriate
action plans for the

Implement Action

SAR operations based

plans

on the devised risk
control measures

Expected
Outputs
♦ Improved performance
(effectiveness and efficiency),
♦ More lives saved,
♦ Increased public trust in the SAR
system (positive image of the SAR
organisation,
♦ Improved country’s reputation

Fig. 4.1: A summary of the risk management process
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Figure 4.1 gives a thumbnail overview about the entire risk management process.
Some of the core benefits associated with a properly implemented risk management
concept have been highlighted in the figure as outputs. This brings us to the end of
chapter 4. In the next chapter, conclusions for the study will be drawn and
appropriate measures that are necessary to achieve good results shall be
recommended.
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5 Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 Conclusion
The primary purpose of this thesis was to enhance the effectiveness of maritime SAR
service provision through application of the concept of risk management. This has
been achieved by practically demonstrating how the concept can be systematically
applied to SAR activities at the operational level to develop appropriate risk control
measures that can be used as a basis for formulating reliable action plans (or
operational procedures) for the SAR operations that are based on risk.

The process involved the identification of risks at each of the four phases of SAR at
the operational level, assessing the risks and then devising appropriate counter
measures67 to cater for the risks.

Of course some will argue that not all the possible potential risk scenarios (for each
of the four selected SAR phases) were dealt with in the analysis; true, it was not
possible to deal with each and every risk scenario. This is so because the thesis
cannot provide a comprehensive and perfect ready-to-apply solution that fits any

67

The various counter measures that were suggested for each risk scenario in the analysis were not my

personal views; rather, they were obtained from various academic sources after carrying out a research
to find suitable/appropriate solutions for a given risk.
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SAR organization.68 Besides, if each and every potential risk scenario were to be
dealt with, the analysis would be too bulky and perhaps confusing to the readers.
However, the thesis can be used by the interested SAR organizations (in developing
countries) as a basis69 to develop their own action plans for SAR operations that are
based on a comprehensive risk assessment, giving consideration to the techniques
employed in this study. What this means is that, each SAR organization should
identify their own risks70 that are likely to deter the effective provision of the SAR
services in their areas of jurisdictions 71 , and then follow the risk management
principles that were applied in this thesis in order to come up with appropriate action
plans or operational procedures that put into consideration the identified risks. This
makes some sense because different SAR organizations have different challenges
depending on the system set-up. For instance, while there could be a very big risk of
false alerts in one SAR system, it may not necessarily be a risk in another SAR
system set-up.

A well developed SAR action plan that puts into consideration all potential risks that
are likely to occur within the system makes it possible for the SAR organization to
know how to act or what to do in almost every SAR encounter. This contributes
handsomely to the effectiveness of the SAR system and maximizes the achievement
of the desired objectives/goals of the SAR organisation.

In addition, having knowledge of the risks that are most likely to occur within the
system enables the SAR managers (decision makers) to make sound and coherent
decisions with respect to the following:

68

There is no one size that fits all; it is a common adage.

69

Standard

70

Events that are likely to go wrong in their SAR system set-ups

71

Could be SRR, territorial waters or inland water bodies
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i. Determining the staffing requirements: the sufficient number of
personnel with desired competences72 that are required for implementing
the devised action plans for the SAR activities;
ii. Determining which personnel are to be employed on a full-time basis
and which ones to employ on a part time basis;73
iii. Development and preparation of effective contingency plans for the
rescue operations that are based on anticipated risks;
iv. Minimising operating costs through prioritisation of tasks with respect to
the identified potential risks;
v. Sourcing of the right type and sufficient quantity of equipment that can
effectively handle and contain the anticipated risks;
vi. Determining the right number of facilities, assets and resources that are
required for the efficient execution of the SAR activities, based on the
identified risks;
vii. Identification of training needs with due regard to the identified risks and
corresponding risk control measures.

5.2 Recommendations
If properly implemented, the concept of risk management can go a long way in
improving the effectiveness of the SAR system. The risk management process per se
helps the SAR organization to achieve its desired goals.

The following measures are recommended for better results:

1. During the process of risk identification, at least all the responsible personnel
should be involved so that everyone can suggest what they think can probably go
72

Personnel who poses the right skills and knowledge necessary to implement the action plans

73

This helps in minimising administration costs.
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wrong within the system. All possible events that are likely to go wrong should
be identified irrespective of how minor they might seem to be. There are various
ways in which risks can be identified and the following are some of them:
•

Examine past mission execution reports, and especially the debriefing
reports;

•

Consult experienced SAR operational personnel: Experienced SAR
operational personnel within the SAR organisation are a very big resource
when it comes to identifying risks within the SAR system;74

•

Consult outside experts: People who are not part of the SAR
organizational staff can provide very useful expert opinions on what they
think can possibly go wrong within the SAR organization;

•

Regarding the equipment, regular inspections and testing can reveal some
things that can go wrong during the actual mission;

•

Distribute a questionnaire to all the relevant SAR personnel within the
organization asking them for their opinion about what can go wrong
within the system;

•

Exercises can reveal a number of events that are likely to go wrong during
the actual mission execution; use them regularly.

2. After all the possible potential risks have been identified, then collective efforts
should be made to strike off the list all those risks with a low likelihood of
occurrence and less degree of severity (minor impact in case of risk occurrence).
Figure 2.1 (P. 12) should be used as a basis for deciding which risks should be
dealt with and which ones to ignore;

74

This was the method that was used in this analysis; questionnaires were distributed to the

experienced SAR operational personnel in the field requesting them to identify what was most likely
to go wrong in their SAR systems.
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3. Putting into consideration the techniques employed in this study, the risks which
remain on the list should be thoroughly analyzed and assessed in order to devise
appropriate counter measures to cater for them;
4. A cost benefit analysis of the proposed risk control measures should be
performed to determine the most appropriate and cost effective options that will
enhance the effective provision of the SAR services;
5. A comprehensive 75 action plan that puts into account all the identified risks
should be prepared. The action plan adopted should be well documented and its
implementation tracked as part of the reporting process.

In addition to the above, the following measures should also be put into
consideration:
i. Risk communication: there should be an interactive exchange of information about
the identified risks amongst all the risk assessors, SAR coordinators (managers),
SAR mission coordinators, the RCC personnel, SAR operatives, all the SAR
stakeholders, the general public and all other interested parties. This helps to
inform everyone about the potential risks, their associated consequences and what
to do to minimize or prevent them from occurring.

The best way of

communicating risks should be the openness of the manner in which risk baseddecisions are made and through regular meetings (with the stakeholders).
ii. The risk management process should be a continuous undertaking by the
responsible personnel within the SAR organization because new types of risks keep
emerging every day and there is a need to provide for them;
iii. The SAR system’s effectiveness should be a collective responsibility of all the
authorities responsible for public safety in the country. For instance, not much can
be achieved by the SAR organization to improve the SAR system in the country if

75

Covering all the four SAR phases
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there are no safety regulations 76 put in place by the responsible government
authorities;
iv. Although this thesis is concerned with only maritime SAR activities, it is normally
recommended to harmonize both maritime and aeronautical SAR activities. Also,
if possible, a regional approach to providing SAR services is normally preferred to
the individual country approach;
v. Volunteer SAR services should be encouraged and supported whenever there is a
possibility to do so.
vi. In order to access some assistance for SAR resources from the international
community, it is highly recommended that the responsible countries ratify77 at least
two conventions: the SOLAS convention and the Convention on maritime SAR;
vii. Mariners should be sensitized about the implications of not adhering to safety
measures prescribed to them while out there at sea; the SAR system should be used
as the last resort after all other safety measures have failed;
viii. Training: in this study, training was repeatedly recommended as one of the risk
control measures for dealing with almost every risk scenario. This is so because
without proper training of the SAR personnel, nothing much can be achieved,
however concrete the action plans might be; without properly trained and qualified
SAR personnel to make sound decisions and to take appropriate actions,
information contained in the action plans will always remain just information
(USCG SAR Proceedings, P.69). In this regard therefore, training should always
be given priority if action plans are to be turned into realistic goals. In line with
this, the International Maritime Organisation has developed some model courses
which can be used as a reference guide by the SAR decision makers to select
appropriate training courses for their staff; these include, inter alia:
¾ Training for Maritime Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator (model
course 3.14);
76

Regulations that cover the construction, onboard safety equipment, crew training, operating

procedures, etc
77

In case they have not done so to-date.
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¾ Training for Maritime SAR Administrator (model course 3.13, vol. 1);
¾ Compendium for Maritime SAR Administrator (model course 3.13, vol.
2).
These model courses are very helpful because they specify clearly the technical
content and levels of knowledge expected to be achieved by the trainees at the end of
the training course.
ix. The effectiveness of the implemented risk control measures should be continuously
monitored.

If there is no change, or if there are only minor changes in the

effectiveness of the SAR service provision after implementing all the relevant
control measures, then the risk control process is probably not worth the resources
expended on it and an immediate review of the process should be conducted.
Feedback on the implementation and the effectiveness of the adopted action plans
can be obtained from the risk reporting process, internal reviews and other
available information.

Finally, it is hoped that this thesis will be of great assistance to improving the quality
of SAR services in the countries78 that might have difficulties in applying the risk
management concept to SAR activities.

78

Most notably the developing countries
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE

1.0 Introduction
This questionnaire is in support of how to apply the concept of risk management to
improve the effectiveness of SAR service provision mostly in developing countries.
The research is being conducted by a student at World Maritime University in
Malmö, Sweden.

2.0 Background Information
To be of practical value, managing risk needs to be an integral part of the
management planning and review processes to support priority setting and decisionmaking by clearly informing managers about key risks, the likelihood of their
occurrence and their impact.

With respect to search and rescue service provision, failure to manage risks can
hugely threaten the overall objectives of a SAR system set-up.

It is therefore of paramount importance that potential risks which can hinder the
objectives of the SAR organization are identified and suitable remedial measures put
into place in order to reduce the impact on resources and enhance the services that
are provided.

NOTE:
1- By definition, risks are those things, which can go wrong unexpectedly and
impair ones ability to meet the set objectives.
2- Generally, SAR can be categorically divided into two major parts:
a) the management level, and
b) the operational level
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At the operational level SAR can be chronologically (in the order of occurrence)
divided into four major phases, namely:
i. Emergency phase (Ship or person in danger)
ii. Initial response from the SAR system
iii. Actual mission or activation of the rescue operation
iv. Mission conclusion

One of the preliminary steps in managing risk is the identification of risks and their
sources.

In light of the above, therefore, this questionnaire seeks your implicit experience and
knowledge in the field of SAR service provision to identify things, which can go
wrong (risks) at each of the phases mentioned above using your SAR organisation a
reference.
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PHASE
1. Emergency phase

WHAT CAN GO WRONG?

(Hazard or risk Identification)

i. False alert or distress signal

(For example)

ii.

iii.

iv.

v.

vi.

vii.

i. Delay in response or longer response time (For example)
2. Initial Response
ii.

iii.

iv.

v.

3. Actual mission

i. inadequacy of required/needed resources (For example)
ii. mix up or confusion in issue of command

iii.
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iv.

v.

vi.

vii.

4. Mission conclusion
i. Mission concluded prematurely (For example)
ii.

iii.

iv.
v.
vi.

Please also respond to the following questions:
Part A
i. How often do the identified risks interfere with the successful provision of the
SAR services in your organisation?
ii. Does your organization have in place a streamlined system for managing the
identified risks? No / yes
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iii. If YES, please suggest ways in which your organization/department manages
those risks; what tools and strategies have proven very effective to manage
those risks
Part B
(i)

Have you or your organization ever faced an emergency situation(s)
which overwhelmed the capacity of the search and rescue operations?
Yes / No.

(ii)

If YES, what are the reasons why you failed to foresee or predict that
such a disaster which can overwhelm your capacity to handle can strike?

(iii)

How did you then react in such a situation?

(iv)

What lessons did you then learn from the incident?

(v)

If NO, what do you attribute your success to i.e. why have you been
successful in that regard?

Part C
i. How many rescue operations do you conduct on average per year?
ii. How successful are those operations?
iii. Number of failed operations: ……….
iv. Any specific reasons for the failure of those operations?
v. Number of successful operations:………….

Do you consider your organization/SAR unit as being successful as far as
SAR service provision is concerned?
YES/NO

Thank you very much for responding to these questions
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